to retain the pretence of kingship and those against having any king at all. It was only as the Rump began to focus its attention upon the practicalities of the outcome of the king's trial, particularly in the wake of the resolutions of 4 January, that it became clearer which course they were prepared to take. 28 
II.
Those who remained at Westminster between Pride's Purge and the regicide simply could not allow the issue of the nation's settlement to remain in limbo until after the king's trial. The majority seem to have been energized by that same motive that Whitelocke claims dominated the meeting of MPs on 23 December -they were determined 'not to leave all to the sword'. 29 Above all, they wanted to ensure that the outcome of the trial caused minimal disruption to the governance of the nation; it
should not bring to a halt the machinery of local government or the functioning of the law courts. Consequently, in the weeks leading up to the regicide a number of seemingly mundane questions occupied the Commons, the answers to which compelled them to confront the likely consequences of the king's trial for the future governance of the country. In dealing with those practicalities, however, they tended to take decisions that seem like rather more than pragmatic responses to difficult circumstances. Rather than devising expedients that left open or equivocal the nature of 28 The rumour concerning putting the Duke of Gloucester on the throne reached its zenith in late Dec. but faded thereafter. The opaque reference about a quarrel over 'drinking to Harry the Ninth' in a letter of 6 Jan. 1649 from clerk of the Commons Ralph Darnell to Whitelocke suggests the incident occurred in the recent past. But Darnell also reports how a resolution on 6 Jan. that the trial commissioners should next meet in the Painted Chamber -the alleged scene of the quarrel -was taken by some to mean that attitudes towards the trial and its outcome had since changed. See D. Underdown, Pride's Purge (Oxford, 1971) , p. 183 and footnote for Darnell's letter. By 8 January, Nedham reported that should those pursuing the king's trial 'ridd their hands of his Majesty' they would 'guilt their designe' upon Gloucester too and would instead 'assert (though not declare) themselves (yet) in the posture of free states'. He also added that the plan to crown Gloucester had not been helped by the fact that 'divers of that fackcion that have forborne sitting in the house' since Pride's Purge 'declared they would not submitt to the D. of Glouc.' See Bod. Lib., Clarendon MS 34, fol. 72v. 29 BL, Add. MS 37344, fols. 237v-238v.
England's future settlement the Commons acted as if the obliteration of kingship was a foregone conclusion.
One such issue that soon came under the Commons' consideration was the form of oath to be sworn by newly appointed officeholders. While there had hitherto been a requirement to swear oaths of allegiance to the king and his successors, the debates over settlement made uncertain to whom, or to what, future officeholders should swear.
With elections to the Common Council in the City looming, the Commons empowered a committee on 28 December to 'consider of the Oaths to be taken' by the elected councilmen, as well as the form of 'all other Oaths taken, through the whole Kingdom'. 30 Although the Commons prompted this committee to make report of the form of the oath to be taken by the common councilmen on 4 Rather, its design asserted boldly that the people -or rather the people's representatives -had reclaimed those powers that originally derived from them alone.
The 'freedom' that the seal boldly claimed had been 'restored' by God's blessing was the people's right to be governed according to the laws that they themselves had created, without the tyrannical interference of kings. The laws, the guarantor of the people's freedom, would no longer be servile to the will of just one man but would be exercised in the name of the people, for the common good. As such, the iconography of the seal, agreed on 9 January, reflected those changes to legal proceedings confirmed by the grand committee earlier that same day. On 4 January 1649, the 54 CJ, vi. 115 (9 Jan.).
Commons resolved that the King and Lords had no legislative function. Five days later, in their resolutions concerning the law courts and the design of the great seal, they divested the King of his juridical functions as well. What remained? Should it surprise us that on 7 February the Commons concluded that the office of king was 'unnecessary'?
Indeed, the introduction of the new seal was carefully managed to coincide with the constitutional changes that followed the regicide. On 7 February, after formally resolving to abolish the kingly office, the Commons ordered that the new seal should be delivered the next day. 55 The seal's engraver, Thomas Simon, would have had his work cut out to get the seal prepared in time. Whereas it had taken over two months to prepare the 1643 seal, he may have had as little as 12 days to complete that of 1649.
56
It is easy to underrate the logistical effort needed for a constitutional change as farreaching as that achieved in 1649; it required time and preparation. To ensure the new regime could take up the reins of the executive power as soon as the change of government was effected the new seal had to be planned well in advance. As in 1643, so in 1649, the Commons recognised that the seal was vital for the effective exercise of the executive powers. In the days following its introduction, new patents were issued under the seal to the Judges, Sheriffs and Commissions of the Peace. By these means the organs of justice and local government were empowered by, and brought into line 55 CJ, vi. 133 (7 Feb.) 56 This is on the assumption that Simon began the work only after receiving the Commons' authorization on 26 Jan. In 1643, Simon was appointed to create the seal in mid-July and delivered it in late Sept. CJ, iii. 174, 257. The speed with which the seal was made can also be inferred from its inferior quality: the matrices soon wore out, prompting the Commons to order a replacement seal, to the same design, less than three years later. opinion that government could not continue without a king; that to alter the form of legal proceedings was tantamount to a change of government. Yet, it is also clear that there were a majority among the Rumpers, Whitelocke included, who held no such scruples. They saw no reason why the administration of justice could not continue without a king. Ultimately, they did not believe a king was integral to legal government and were not prepared to stick upon that point. As such, the Commons' preparations in the weeks before the regicide for government without the king had made entirely plausible government without a king. Officeholders were no longer required to swear allegiance to any king and the laws would no longer run in any king's name. They had effectively made the king a legal non-entity. On 7 February kingship was abolished because it was deemed 'unnecessary', but those discussions and preparations prior to the regicide had surely made that conclusion clear enough.
So why did it take over a week after the regicide for the Commons to resolve upon the abolition of the kingly office? This apparent delay is the clincher for those who claim there was no appetite for constitutional change. But there is a danger that we expect too much. To alter a government was hardly the work of a moment. The likeliest means to condemn the new regime to failure would have been to make haste: to destroy first and consider the replacement as an afterthought.
The Rump did not seize upon the moment of Charles's execution to declare against kingship. Instead, on the day of the king's death they rushed through the House an Act had their laws, executed for their benefit, then 'all the while' the government was 'maintained with as much Honour and Power as under the most wise and well disposed
King that ever blessed the Throne'. 96 For Bacon, the laws of England -not its kingswere the essence of its government. As such, despite the abolition of kingship in 1649, the government had not been altered but revived; the principles of its Saxon purity were restored. For this reason Bacon could conclude that as he 'found this Nation a Common-Wealth' at the beginning of his treatise in 1647 'so I leave it, and so may it be for ever'. 97 To Bacon's mind the government that followed the regicide was inherently the same as that which preceded it: the abolition of kingship had made no discernable difference. For Parker, Englishmen were under the 'same Government at this present, as of right it was or ought to have been heretofore' when they had kings. 107 In effect, their 'Ancestors' had 'lived happily' under 'popular Government' for 'hundreds of years'.
108
Because scholars have fixated upon attitudes towards forms of government as a litmus test for radicalism the period's most revolutionary dimension has been ignored.
Evidently those deeply committed to republican forms, or vehemently opposed to monarchical ones, were few. But it hardly follows that the majority yearned for kingship. True, many of the defendants of the new regime admitted that, in theory, kingship could be compatible with a Commonwealth. But their reading of history, infused by parliamentarian arguments and bolstered by recent experiences, taught them that kings rarely served the purposes for which they were chosen. Because so much was entrusted to just one man the potential for the government to descend into tyranny was intolerably high. There was nothing to suggest that situation would change.
Instead, they claimed that forms of government should only be retained so long as they secured the ends of government -the public good or common-wealth. As such, the most striking aspect of these early defences of the Commonwealth regime was their indifference towards forms of government. Rather than defend any one form the Commonwealth's apologists stressed that the liberty of the English people was embodied in their freedom to choose their laws and those who executed them.
As the Rump's Declaration of March 1649 put it, because kingly government failed to secure those ends for which it was created, that 'same Power and Authority which first erected a King, and made him a publique Officer for the common good' was perfectly entitled to 'change the Government for a better' and 'resolve into A Free State'.
111
Similarly, Thorpe stressed that there was no necessity to adhere to forms of government once they proved unfit for purpose: if the people found 'cause to dislike' their 'former choice' of government, they 'being not tyed. 'choose againe and take some other Form' and thereby avoid the 'evils they suffered under their former choice'. 112 The form of government was simply a means to an end.
There was nothing special about kings -they were never essential to the effective functioning of England's government. The kingly office was abolished not only because it was necessary for the 'liberty, safety and publique interest of the people' but also because the exercise of that office in any one person was itself 'unnecessary'. again. To this extent, the real loophole in the 1649 Act was not to be found in its provisions but in those principles that animated it: that the people were free to settle whatever government they, or more properly their representatives, decided was in their best interests.
117
In reality, the Rump's resolution to abolish kingship 'in any single person' seems to have been calculated to exemplify the point that, even though the office of king was abolished, those ends for which kingship had been established remained. As Thorpe explained at York, the Commons had abolished the office of king as corrupted by the single person but not those powers and ends which, in theory, had defined that office.
The king was merely the 'chiefe Officer' who was 'trusted' by the people with the 'Administration of that Government'; it was nothing more than a synonym for 'the must reflect this. 123 As it struggled for survival, however, the Rump was hardly likely to advertise the discrepancy between its professed ideals and the disappointing reality.
Whether out of sheer weight of business or the corruption of its members, the Rump's failure to dissolve itself and provide for successive parliaments, meant those commonwealth principles on which its establishment had been justified increasingly became a source of embarrassment and censure. 
